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Abstract Carona (2008) investigates the roles of nonfinancial performance indi-
cators and long-term commitments in an incentive contracting setting. The paper
develops a multiperiod agency model in which nonfinancial performance indicators
are shown to be valuable in providing the agent with desirable incentives. The
relative importance of nonfinancial measures depends on the level of commitment
that the principal and the agent can sustain. While long-term contracts are more
efficient than short-term contracts, the analysis shows that a sequence of overlap-
ping medium-term contracts can be as efficient as long-term contracts. In this
discussion, I provide a brief review of the related streams of literature and discuss
the paper’s contributions to them. The discussion also illustrates the intuition behind
the paper’s main findings through a simple example and raises questions for future
research.
Keywords Nonfinancial performance measures  Commitment 
Managerial incentive contracts
JEL Classification M41  D21  M21
1 Introduction
Carona (2008) examines a multiperiod incentive contracting problem in which a
manager must be provided with incentives to invest in intangible assets such as
customer satisfaction. The paper relates to two distinct streams of literature in
accounting and economics. The first stream of literature has investigated the role
of nonfinancial performance measures in managerial compensation contracts. A
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central question in this literature is how to ensure that managers would be willing
to sacrifice current performance for potential payoffs in the distant future. For
instance, how do we motivate managers with short planning horizons to invest in
R&D activities with payoffs that would be realized, if ever, with significant
delays? Performance measures based on conventional accounting information
offer a potential remedy to this managerial horizon problem. Under accrual
accounting, current investment expenditures are initially capitalized as assets and
expensed in future periods as the benefits of investments are subsequently
realized.
For investments in ‘‘soft’’ assets such as customer satisfaction, however, it is
often difficult to separate investment expenditures from regular operating costs. To
motivate managers to invest in these intangible assets, firms often include
nonfinancial indicators in managerial performance measures. (See Kaplan and
Norton (1996) and Ittner and Larcker (1998). Many recent papers have investigated
the incentive contracting role of nonfinancial performance measures in formal
agency settings. Datar et al. (2001) and Dikolli (2001), among others, study the
value of contracting on nonfinancial performance measures in single period models.
Dutta and Reichelstein (2003) and Sliwka (2002) examine two-period agency
models in which the investment undertaken in the first period yields payoffs in the
second period.
The second stream of literature, to which this paper contributes, has investigated
the value of commitment in multiperiod agency relationships. Fudenberg et al.
(1990) identify circumstances under which short-term contracts can do as well as
long-term contracts. They show that the absence of asymmetric information at all
contracting dates is one of the key requirements for short-term contracts to replicate
the performance of long-term contracts. In the presence of asymmetric information,
long-term contracts are usually more efficient than short-term contracts. To resolve
the incentive problems created by private information, it is often necessary to
commit ex ante to ex post inefficiencies. See, for instance, Chiappori et al. (1994),
Fudenberg et al. (1990), and Rey and Salanie (1990, 1996).
Carona examines a multiperiod LEN model in which an agent must be motivated
to exert a personally costly effort as well as to invest in an intangible asset (for
example, customer satisfaction). The intangible asset yields a stream of decreasing
future cash flows. A maintained assumption is that investments in intangible assets
are soft and cannot be separated from regular operating expenses. The paper extends
Dutta and Reichelstein (2003) by considering investments that yield payoffs over an
infinite horizon and by varying the level of commitment that the principal and the
agent can sustain in their contracting relationship. In particular, the paper compares
the efficiencies of three different commitment scenarios in which the principal and
the agent can commit to: (1) one period contracts (short-term contracts), (2) long-
term contracts for the entire contracting horizon of T periods, and (3) overlapping
two-period contracts (medium-term contracts). For each commitment scenario, the
paper allows for the investment decisions to be either observable or unobservable to
the principal.
The most interesting result of the paper is that (regardless of whether the actual
investment choices are observable to the principal) a sequence of overlapping two-
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period contracts achieves the same performance as an optimal long-term contract.1
This result is interesting because medium-term compensation contracts seem to be
prevalent in the real world employment relationships. Carona’s results suggest that
there may not be any loss of efficiency in restricting to such realistic contracts.
The paper also identifies a class of value-added performance measures, which is
optimal for different commitment and observability scenarios.
2 Model
Carona considers a T-period agency relationship between a risk-neutral principal
and a risk-averse agent. The agent contributes a productive effort in each period. In
addition, the agent can invest in an intangible asset (for example, customer
satisfaction) in each period. The aggregate cash flow in period t is given by
ct ¼ et  hðbtÞ þ v  At1 þ et;
where et is the agent’s effort choice; h(bt) is the (cash) cost of investment under-
taken in period t; v is the cash flow generated by each unit of intangible asset; At-1 is
the units of intangible asset available at the beginning of period t; and et is a
normally distributed random variable. The intrinsic value of intangible asset decays
at a constant rate, d, and can be replenished through new investments:
At ¼ ð1  dÞ  At1 þ bt;
where bt denotes the amount of new investment in period t. The investments in
intangible asset are not personally costly to the agent. Yet the principal faces an
induced incentive problem with regard to these investments because they are not
directly contractible.
The first-best investment choice will maximize
NPVðbtÞ ¼ x  bt  hðbtÞ;
where x  vdþr is the present value of the cash flow generated by one unit of
investment. Let bo denote the first-best investment, that is, h0ðboÞ ¼ x: While the
accounting system cannot provide a direct measure of the amount of new investment
made in a given period, it generates a contractible nonfinancial performance indicator
(NFPI) yt, which is a noisy measure of the intangible asset at the end of period t, in
particular, yt ¼ At þ gt; where gt is a normally distributed measurement noise term.
The paper employs the multiperiod LEN framework developed in Dutta and
Reichelstein (1999). In each period, the agent’s compensation St is a linear function
of his performance measure:
St ¼ at þ bt  ½ct þ ut  yt:
Here, at is the fixed salary; bt is the bonus coefficient; and ct þ ut  yt is the
performance measure. The performance measure is a linear combination of the
1 Rey and Salanie (1990, 1996) derive a similar result. The relationship to these two papers is discussed
in Sect. 4 below.
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current cash flow ct and the nonfinancial performance indicator yt with the relative
weight on yt given by ut.
The analysis focuses on a fixed effort scenario in which the principal seeks to
induce the maximum amount of effort in each period. Consequently, the bonus
coefficients are identical across periods and fixed exogenously at bt = h for each t.
As part of the LEN framework, the agent is assumed to have additively separable
CARA preferences and can borrow and save at the same rate as the principal.
Therefore, the principal’s choice of compensation contracts does not have to be
concerned with the agent’s desire for intertemporal smoothing of consumption.
3 Value of commitment
Consider first a commitment scenario in which the principal and the agent can
commit at the outset to a long-term contract for the entire employment horizon of T
periods. Carona assumes that while the two parties can commit to a long-term
contract, they are unable to commit not to renegotiate the contract at subsequent
dates. His analysis thus focuses on renegotiation-proof long-term contracts.2
Since the agent discounts the future at the same rate as the principal and the
bonus coefficients are exogenously fixed to be identical across periods, a long-term
contract based on cash flows alone (that is, ut = 0 for each t) would be enough to
make the agent properly internalize the investment returns realized during his
employment. It therefore follows that a long-term contract would induce the first-
best investment in each period if
u1 ¼ u2 ¼    ¼ uT1 ¼ 0;
and
uT ¼ x:
To see this, note that the agent internalizes the investment payoffs for the first T
periods directly through realized cash flows. Setting the weight on the NFPI equal to
the capitalization factor x in the last period ensures that the agent also internalizes
the investment returns that will be realized after his employment ends with the firm.
This choice of weights on the nonfinancial performance indicators would indeed be
optimal if the NFPI in the last period were free of measurement error, that is,
yT = AT.
Since the NFPI is subject to measurement error in each period, however, the
agent’s investment incentives must be balanced against the cost of imposing risk.
Consequently, as shown in Proposition 2 in Carona, the optimal long-term contract
induces underinvestment in each period and the optimal coefficients on NFPIs
satisfy
2 Carona allows for investments to be unobservable as well as observable (but not verifiable). My




0\u1\u2\   \uT\x:
When the two parties can only commit to one period contracts, the agent
rationally anticipates that the principal will act opportunistically in setting the terms
of future contracts. The agent thus disregards future investment payoffs in making
his current investment decision. To provide the manager with investment incentives,
it becomes essential to include the NFPI in the agent’s performance measure.
To illustrate the value of commitment, it is useful to consider a special case in
which yt = At ? gt for t 2 f1; . . .T  1g; but yT = AT. That is, the NFPI measures
the value of the intangible asset with error in each of the the first T - 1 periods but
provides a perfect signal in the last period. As noted earlier, in this case, long-term
contracting allows the principal to induce the first-best investment in each period
without exposing the agent to the risk associated with noisy NFPIs. The optimal
long-term contract is characterized in Table 1 below.
As long as the nonfinancial indicator in the last period provides a noiseless
estimate of the intangible asset, long-term contracting allows the principal to
insulate the agent from all of the risks associated with NFPIs in the earlier periods
and yet induce the first-best investment in each period. In contrast, without a long-
term commitment, provision of investment incentives requires that the agent’s
compensation be contingent on the noisy NFPI in each period. Table 2 below
provides a characterization of the optimal short-term contracts.
A direct comparison reveals that short-term contracts are inefficient, since they
(1) expose the agent to the risk associated with the noisy NFPIs, and (2) induce the
agent to invest less than the first-best amount in each of the first T - 1 periods.
One of the main results of the paper is that all the efficiencies of long-term
contracting can be captured with a much lower level of commitment between the
two parties. In particular, the paper shows that the performance of long-term
contracts can be replicated by a sequence of overlapping two period contracts. To
illustrate this result, let us consider a three-period model (that is, T = 3). Under this
‘‘medium-term’’ contracting scenario, the principal and the agent
• Sign a two-period contract fS1; S^2g at date 0,
• Renegotiate the remaining portion of the original contract; that is, S^2; to a two-
period contract {S2, S3} at date 1.
Table 1 Optimal long-term
contract
Period 1 2 … T
NFPI Noisy Noisy … Noiseless
Optimal weight ut 0 0 … x
Investment bt FB FB … FB
Table 2 Optimal short-term
contract
Period 1 2 … T
NFPI Noisy Noisy … Noiseless
Optimal weight ut [0 [0 … x
Investment bt \FB \FB … FB
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If the agent believes that contract S^2 would be replaced with a new (extended)
contract {S2, S3} at date 1, then he would essentially behave as he would under the
long-term contract {S1, S2, S3}. The ‘‘off-equilibrium’’ contract S^2 would then have
no impact on the agent’s investment and effort incentives. Of course, it must be
incentive compatible for both the principal and the agent to replace S^2 with {S2, S3}
at date 1. These incentive-compatibility requirements are not trivial since the
renegotiation takes place under asymmetric information: the agent knows his
investment choice in the first period, but the principal does not.
Since the intuition for this equivalence result is not very transparent, it is useful
to explicitly construct a sequence of two-period contracts that attain the same
performance as an optimal long-term contract. Let us again consider a stark setting
in which the nonfinancial indicators are noisy in the first two periods but perfect in
the last period. As observed earlier, the optimal long-term contract will induce the
first-best investment in each period without exposing the agent to the risk associated
with y1 and y2. Let St = (at, ut) denote the contract for period t.
3 An optimal long-





3 are chosen so that, conditional on first-best investments, the certainty
equivalent of the agent’s compensation in each period is exactly equal to his
reservation wage of zero. That is,
a1 þ h½e  hðboÞ  gðeÞ  q  h2  r2 ¼ 0; ð1Þ
a2 þ h½e  hðboÞ þ v  bo  gðeÞ  q  h2  r2 ¼ 0; ð2Þ
and
a3 þ h½e  hðboÞ þ v  A2 þ x  A3  gðeÞ  q  h2  r2 ¼ 0; ð3Þ
where A2 = (1 - d)  bo ? b0 and A3 ¼ ð1  dÞ2  bo þ ð1  dÞ  bo þ b0: This
contract is optimal because it induces optimal effort and investment choices and
meets the agent’s ex ante participation constraint.4
We now wish to show that there exists a sequence of two-period contracts that
attains the same performance as the optimal long-term contract identified above.
Suppose that the two parties sign an initial contract fða1; 0Þ; ða^2; xÞg; where a1 is as
given by Eq. 1. The parameter a^2 is again chosen so that the certainty equivalent of
the agent’s compensation in period 2 is equal to his reservation wage if he invests
the first-best amounts in each period. That is,
a^2 þ h½e  hðboÞ þ v  bo þ x  A2  gðeÞ  q  h2ðr2 þ x2  l2Þ ¼ 0: ð4Þ
While this initial contract exposes the agent to the risk associated with the noisy
NFPI in the second period, the agent does not bear this risk on the ‘‘equilibrium’’
path as this initial contract is ultimately replaced with a contract in which u2 = 0.
3 Since the bonus coefficients are exogenously fixed at bt = h in each period, a single period contract St
is completely described by the pair (at, ut).
4 However, it is not necessary for optimality that the fixed salary parameters take the values given by
Eqs. 1–3. Neither the principal nor the agent cares about the timing of payments, and therefore these




In particular, the second-period contract ða^2; xÞ is subsequently renegotiated to a
two-period contract fða2; 0Þ; ða3; xÞg at date 1, where the fixed salary parameters,
a2 and a

3; are given by Eqs. 2 and 3, respectively.
Suppose that, in the first period, the agent makes his investment decision
believing that the second period contract ða^2; xÞ will be ultimately replaced with
fða2; 0Þ; ða3; xÞg: The agent then faces the same investment incentives as he would
under the long-term contract fða1; 0Þ; ða2; 0Þ; ða3; xÞg; and he will invest the first-
best amount. Consider now the agent’s investment incentives if he does not plan to
renegotiate his original contract. Since the original contract assigns weight x to the
NFPI in the second period, the agent will again choose to invest the first-best
amount in each of the two periods covered by the original contract. Furthermore,
given the above choice of a^2; a2; and a

3; the agent is indifferent between contracts
ða^2; xÞ and fða2; 0Þ; ða3; xÞg: Thus, these medium-term contracts ensure that the
agent (1) invests the first best amount in each period, and (2) weakly prefers to
extend the contract at date 1.
On the other hand, the principal is strictly better off by renegotiating contract
ða^2; xÞ and extending it to fða2; 0Þ; ða3; xÞg: To see this, note that if the principal
does not offer a new contract at date 1, she has to compensate the incumbent
agent in the second period according to the original contract ða^2; xÞ: Conse-
quently, the principal will have to reimburse the agent for bearing the risk
associated with the noisy performance indicator y2. Furthermore, if the incumbent
agent is let go after the second period, the best that the principal can do is sign a
one-period contract ða3; xÞ with a new agent in the last period. Hence, relative to
the case when the original contract is not renegotiated, extension of the original
contract through renegotiation allows the principal to lower her expected
compensation cost in the second period.5 It therefore follows that the performance
of an optimal long-term contract can be attained through a sequence of two-period
contracts.
It is useful to relate this finding of equivalence between medium-term and long-
term contracts to seemingly identical results obtained in Rey and Salanie (1990,
1996). Rey and Salanie (1990) obtain this equivalence result in a repeated moral
hazard setting when there is symmetric information at each possible contracting
date. However, the assumption of symmetric information rules out adverse selection
problems when the agent has superior information about some productivity
parameter as well as moral hazard problems in which the agent becomes privately
informed because of his past actions that affect future outcomes. Rey and Salanie
(1996) show that medium-term contracts can be as efficient as long-term contracts
in standard adverse selection settings; that is, when the agent’s private information
results from his superior knowledge of productivity. Carona extends this equiva-
lence result to asymmetric information settings in which the agent’s private
information is a result of past hidden investment choices that affect future cash
flows.
5 It can be verified from Eqs. 2 and 4 that the principal’s savings are q  h2  x2  l2; since E½S^2 ¼
E½S2 þ q h2  x2  l2:
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4 Accounting performance measures
Carona shows that the optimal performance measure can be represented as the
product of a conventional accounting aggregation process. In particular, the paper
derives a class of value-added performance measures, which is shown to be optimal
for different commitment scenarios. When the NFPI provides a noiseless estimate of
the intangible asset, this value-added performance measure coincides with the
familiar residual income measure.
To illustrate this accounting representation, note that the fair value (that is, the
present value of future cash flows) of the intangible asset created in period t is
ft ¼ x  bt ¼ x  ½At  ð1  dÞ  At1:
Since bt is the agent’s private information, the accounting system cannot record the
intangible asset at this value. However, a noisy, but unbiased, estimate of the asset’s
fair value can be obtained by replacing At with its unbiased estimate of yt.
Accordingly, the book value of the intangible asset becomes
Bt ¼ x  ½yt  ð1  dÞ  yt1:
Carona shows that if this asset is depreciated according to the so-called declining
balance depreciation schedule and the clean surplus relationship holds, then
residual income in period t becomes equal to
RIt ¼ et  hðbtÞ þ x  bt þ noise:
Under declining balance depreciation schedule, therefore, residual income effec-
tively combines the raw cash flow information and the NFPI signal so as to reflect
the present value of returns from the current investment (that is, x  bt) in the same
period. Consequently, if residual income is used as the performance measure, the
agent will choose the first-best investment in each period.
Residual income would indeed be an optimal performance measure if the NFPI
provided a noiseless estimate of the intangible asset. Since the NFPI measures the
intangible asset with error, however, inducing the first-best investment is not
optimal because it requires exposing the agent to too much risk. The principal trades
off the agent’s investment incentives against the cost of imposing risk, and
optimally induces underinvestment. To attain the optimal performance, Carona
suggests modifying the residual income measure to a value-added metric, which
calibrates the agent’s risk exposure through the choice of coefficient mt:
VAt ¼ et  hðbtÞ þ mt  x  bt þ noise:
This performance measure will provide optimal investment incentives provided that
the coefficients mt are chosen appropriately.
However, the value-based performance measure identified above is consistent
with ‘‘conventional’’ accounting only when the calibration coefficient mt = 1. But
mt = 1 is optimal only under the exceptional scenario when the nonfinancial
performance indicator is perfect, that is, yt = At for each t. Given this limitation, it
is not apparent how this particular form of aggregating raw information is any more




Carona extends the earlier work on the nonfinancial performance measures by
studying a setting in which investments generate payoffs extending beyond the
agent’s planning horizon. In addition, and more significantly, his paper contributes to
our understanding of the value of commitment in multiperiod agency relationships.
The analysis shows that a limited commitment scenario, where the parties negotiate a
sequence of two-period contracts, can yield the same performance as attained with
long-term contracting.
This equivalence between medium-term and long-term contracts is derived in a
multiperiod LEN framework. The LEN model provides an analytically tractable
framework, but this tractability requires some strong assumptions: (1) contracts are
linear and performance measures are normally distributed; (2) the agent’s risk
preference can be represented by an additively-separable CARA utility function;
and (3) the agent can borrow and save at the same rate as the principal. It would be
interesting to investigate which assumptions of the LEN framework, if any, are
crucial for the equivalence result. For instance, would the equivalence result
continue to hold if compensation contracts were allowed to be non-linear; that is, if
assumption (1) of the LEN framework were dropped?
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